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The past several years have witnessed a burgeoning of  research in the field of  folk metaethics, or 
the way that ordinary, philosophically untutored folk view the status of  morality. Interest in this 
research has been fueled by two distinct yet overlapping quarters. On the one hand, psychologists 
have been interested in how folk react to moral disagreement, and the ways that morality may 
enlist distinctive psychological processes or motivate distinctive behavior. For example, some 
work has shown that a tendency to thinking of  morality in absolute1 terms arises early in 
development (Wainryb et al. 2004). Other studies have found that priming people to think of  
morality in objectivist terms increases their prosocial behavior (Rai and Holyoak 2013; Young 
and Durwin 2013), while still others have found a correlation between embracing relativism 
about morality and being tolerant of  others (Wright, Cullum, and Schwab 2008). Psychologists 
have also looked at how folk metaethical views might be related to other psychological  constructs, 
such as belief  in moral progress or belief  in a just world (Uttich, Tsai, and Lombrozo 2014). On 
the other hand, philosophers have also (and increasingly) been interested in this research 
program, though for some distinct reasons. A chief  motivator for this latter group of  researchers 
has been the prominent role that folk metaethical claims play in philosophical theories. In 
particular, most metaethicists maintain that part their goal is to make sense of  ordinary moral 
practice which itself  is committed to a conception of  morality as absolute (and not relative). This 
datum serves to constrain and shape philosophical metaethics, since those working in this field 
feel compelled to make sense of  it.
In what follows, I will discuss why philosophers take on this commitment in the first place. 
Next, I will outline the relevant experimental research exploring whether, and to what extent, 
ordinary folk think of  morality in absolute terms. As we shall see, folk metaethical commitments 
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are in fact woolier than most philosophers have assumed. Finally, I will turn toward a more 
 general discussion of  what implications this work may have for philosophical ethics.
14.1 Metaethics and Folk Morality
Metaethicists attempt to characterize the nature and status of  morality by stepping away from 
particular moral issues and judgments and then looking, systematically and abstractly, at the 
underlying assumptions, commitments, and foundations of  ordinary moral practice. Although 
metaethics is a large and diverse field, a key question within this discipline is whether moral judg-
ments make reference to objective moral properties that are independent of  human thought and 
sentiment, or whether morality can only be valid relative to the standards of  a moral community 
or moral framework. There are many things to consider when trying to answer this question. 
Philosophers reflect on ordinary platitudes or truisms concerning morality, on conceptual 
analyses of  moral concepts, as well as the structure of  ordinary language and the nature of  
moral phenomenology. The purpose or goal of  this research is to arrive at some unified theory 
about the status of  morality. Put another way, philosophers are trying to systematically charac-
terize and unify the phenomenon that needs explaining.
Michael gill has described the paradigmatic method of  metaethics as involving a two‐stage 
process (gill 2009). The first stage in this process includes “gathering examples of  moral ideas 
and terms in everyday language and thought… canvassing commonsense moral judgments, 
linguistic intuitions, and platitudes” (217). Here, philosophers almost inevitably arrive at the 
platitude that everyday moral discourse is committed to moral absolutism, that ordinary folk take 
morality to trade in mind‐independent moral facts, and that if  two individuals disagree about a 
moral issue at least one of  them must be incorrect. Having thus characterized the phenomenon 
that needs explaining, philosophers then move on to the second stage in the  process, which con-
sists in trying to argue for a particular, systematic theory of  the evidence gathered in the first 
stage, usually with a conceptual characterization of  morality as having a certain shape or struc-
ture. For some philosophers, this second step in the analysis will vindicate ordinary moral prac-
tice. That is, some philosophers argue that morality truly is objective and absolute in nature, just 
as ordinary folk maintain. Other philosophers argue to the contrary, and claim that ordinary 
moral practice is mistaken, because the true nature of  morality is not objective and absolute.
For present purposes, the important thing to note is that, regardless of  what comes out of  this 
two‐stage process (whether the resulting theory is a form of  realism, relativism, expressivism, 
etc.), philosophers generally agree at the first stage that ordinary moral practice is committed to 
objectivism. For example, Frank Jackson writes that,
it is part of  current folk morality that convergence will or would occur. We have some kind of  commit-
ment to the idea that moral disagreements can be resolved by sufficient critical reflection—which is 
why we bother to engage in moral debate. To that extent, some sort of  objectivism is part of  current 
folk morality (Jackson 2000, 137).
Stephen Darwall claims that “ethical thought and feeling have ‘objective purport.’ From the 
inside, they apparently aspire to truth or correctness and presuppose that there is something of  
which they can be true or false” (Darwall 1998, 25). Michael Smith also discusses “the  objectivity 
of  moral judgement” and claims that ordinary users of  moral language
seem to think moral questions have correct answers; that the correct answers are made correct by 
objective moral facts; that moral facts are wholly determined by circumstances and that, by engaging 
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in moral conversation and argument, we can discover what these objective moral facts determined by 
the circumstances are (Smith 1994, 6).
He enshrines the importance of  this datum by claiming that “the philosopher’s task is to make 
sense of  a practice having these features” (5). Blackburn talks about “the realistic‐seeming 
nature of  our talk of  evaluations—the way we think we can be wrong about them, that there is 
a truth to be found, and so on” (Blackburn 1984, 180). Richard Joyce sums up the philosophical 
landscape very nicely when he says that
If  morality had never been concerned with objectivity in the first place, why this seemingly compul-
sory ritual that every metaethicist embarks upon of  emphasizing all elements of  his or her theory that 
lean in the direction of  objective authority and downplaying all elements that lean away? (Joyce 
2011, 529)
Joyce’s comment is particularly telling. Philosophers do indeed contort and bend their 
philosophical theories to make sense of  folk moral objectivism (FMO). And, indeed, if  this is a fact 
to be explained (or explained away), then philosophers are doing as they must. In a moment we’ll 
turn to some of  the experimental evidence that may be relevant to assessing this philosophical 
claim. In the meantime, though, it may be helpful to pause and consider, if  only briefly, why it is 
that philosophers believe in folk objectivism.
14.2 The Case for Folk Objectivism
That philosophers (whether realist, relativist, expressivist, or otherwise) embrace FMO is clear. 
Yet why do they do so? There are likely a plurality of  sources supporting objectivist‐seeming talk 
among the folk. Some have argued, for example, that a tendency to regard morality as objective 
and binding is a result of  evolutionary forces, an adaptation that fosters cooperative behavior 
(e.g., Joyce 2006; Ruse 2010). Here, though, I will focus on the following three other sources.
The first, and least acknowledged by philosophers themselves, stems from the close connec-
tion in Anglo‐American culture (and, indeed, throughout much of  the rest of  the world) between 
ethics and religion, and thus with divine command (see, e.g., Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong 
2007). Most individuals in Anglo‐American cultures have believed (and continue to believe) in a 
personal, all‐powerful, all‐knowing, and wholly good god who is the source of  the moral law and 
who rewards and punishes individuals according to its fixed, absolute standard. Accordingly, 
moral knowledge consists in knowledge of  what god creates or endorses as morally good or bad, 
morally right or wrong. What’s more, god does not vacillate or change the rules. Morality 
grounded in a theistic conceptual framework could thus explain the objectivist shape of  folk 
moral discourse in those cultures which serve as the observation points of  moral philosophers. 
At times, religious reasons are proffered in everyday moral discourse. At times not. However, 
 philosophers would do well to acknowledge this fact and not perpetuate what Peter Railton has 
called “the common but regrettable philosophical practice of  ignoring religious points of  view 
when discussing the foundations of  ethics” (Railton 2007, 37).
Second, and independent of  any commitment to a theological grounding of  morality, there 
are a number of  features of  ordinary moral discourse (some of  which are noted in the quotations 
earlier) that are, on the face of  it, reflective of  a commitment to objectivity (cf. Finlay 2008). For 
example, when we make claims about what is right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, we do 
not make such claims using language that qualifies or relativizes them. Rather, we use baldly 
absolutist language. We don’t say, for example, that “murder is wrong only insofar as one values 
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human life and personal protection.” Instead, we say that “murder is wrong” simpliciter. Second, 
people do not seem to treat moral disagreements as they treat disagreements of  taste. Disagreement 
over whether a particular painting is beautiful or a particular drink palatable is not an occasion 
for sustained, reasoned argument, or for entrenched demands for justification. By contrast, we 
offer reasons for our moral judgments and treat moral disagreements as real disputes concerning 
matters of  fact, matters that we can stand to convince others of  by offering persuasive reasons or 
evidence. Indeed, there seems to be an expectation that others will yield to moral reasons, or that 
through argument we get closer to the truth.
Finally, our judgments are often accompanied by relevant reactive attitudes, giving moral 
judgments a felt force that may be missing from other evaluative domains. While there are ways 
of  explaining such a felt force that are amenable to various types of  metaethical theories, it’s 
plausible that, from within the practice of  folk morality (and not as explained by any metaethical 
theory), the compelling force that accompanies prototypical moral judgments might be taken to 
reflect a commitment to moral objectivity.
14.3 The Case for Folk Relativism
The earlier considerations make it easy to see why FMO enjoys a place of  prominence in contem-
porary metaethics. However, some philosophers acknowledge that in everyday moral practice, 
and alongside moments of  moral absolutism, are moments of  questioning and suspension of  
judgment. For example, faced with a puzzling case of  moral disagreement regarding an especially 
vexing moral issue, individuals can be made to feel quite differently. Consider, for example, how 
David Wong characterizes what he calls “moral ambivalence” (Wong 2006). Wong describes 
moral ambivalence as a reaction we can have when we see that otherwise reasonable, knowl-
edgeable, and competent individuals—individuals who seem command our respect—arrive at 
very different moral judgments than our own. This sort of  situation serves to shake our confidence 
that our own judgment is obviously superior or uniquely right.2 This can happen either when 
we fail to persuade them of  our point of  view, or when in the course of  trying to persuade them 
we gain insight into an issue that previously eluded us, and come to appreciate others’ perspec-
tives and the reasons behind their judgments. In such moments, we can come to realize that 
moral disagreement need not take place between communities of  individuals who are radically 
different or incomprehensible to one another. On the contrary, coming to understand different 
ways of  life can render them familiar to us, even if  they remain different in important and sub-
stantial ways. As Wong writes,
Understanding other moral codes and the ways of  life in which they are embedded is not to see them 
as alien and incomprehensible but in some respects familiar and in other respects constituting a 
challenge to our own codes and ways of  life. Since we ourselves are complex and ambivalent moral 
beings, we are able to see that at least some other codes and ways of  life may just as reasonably be 
adopted by decent and informed human beings as our own. (Wong, 20)
Similarly, David Velleman (2013) has written about cultural practices that might seem in 
some ways ethically suspect, but which we might not obviously condemn as objectively wrong or 
false. In these moments, we similarly drop any commitment to absolutism about morality. For 
example, Velleman discusses vranyo, a Russian cultural practice “which is not exactly bullshit-
ting, not exactly fibbing, not exactly joshing, not exactly telling tales.” It is a practice altogether 
different from any of  these, and one for which we have no precise analogue. Velleman notes, for 
example, that
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the purveyor of  vranyo does not quite expect to be believed. He does count on not being unmasked — 
on receiving a straight‐faced hearing — but he also prefers aesthetic appreciation to naive credence. 
It is even unclear whether he thinks that he is telling untruths. (36)
When confronted with this practice, we might, for example, say that it is unethical or morally 
wrong to confabulate and make up lies, to draw a person along by uttering statements that are 
patently untrue, that we have devised on the spur of  the moment. But such a reaction is not 
obvious. Velleman speculates that
he strongest negative attitude we are likely to have is to be glad that we don’t live among the practi-
tioners, while granting that if  we did, we probably wouldn’t regret it. Alternatively, we might feel 
somewhat envious of  the Russians, whose social life is spiced with creative bluffing. (43)
Wong and Velleman thus stress features of  ordinary, everyday moral practices that pull individuals 
away from any commitment to absolutism.
14.4 Empirical Work
Thus far I have sketched how philosophers have emphasized different and diverging aspects of  
ordinary moral practice. Most claim that ordinary practice is best understood as committed to 
objectivism, whereas others emphasize a substantial commitment to relativism. How do we 
assess these claims? Are people committed to absolutism, as some philosophers claim? Or, instead, 
is ordinary moral practice just as accurately described as embracing relativism? Researchers 
have begun to explore systematically the commitments of  ordinary folk. In undertaking this 
task, they have taken cues from metaethicists themselves, who have suggested one way to under-
stand the core issue. Consider the following passage from Smith.
it is a platitude that our moral judgements at least purport to be objective…. Thus if  A says “It is right 
to ϕ in circumstances C” and B says “It is not right to ϕ in circumstances C” then we take it that A and 
B disagree; that at most one of  their judgements is true. (Smith 1994, 86)
The scenario that Smith describes here is one that has been adopted by nearly all the empirical 
studies of  folk metaethics. The idea is simple: if  a person responds to a case of  moral disagree-
ment between two individuals by judging, intuitively, that at most one of  them can be correct, 
they seem to be reflecting a tacit commitment to objectivism about morality.
In an early experimental foray into this issue, Shaun Nichols (2004) presented participants 
with a short story about two individuals—John and Fred – who hold different moral views. John 
claims that “It’s okay to hit people just because you feel like it,” whereas Fred claims that “No, it 
is not okay to hit people just because you feel like it.” Participants were then asked to weigh in on 
this case of  disagreement by choosing which among the following options best represented their 
own views:
1 It is okay to hit or shove people just because you feel like it, so John is right and Fred is wrong.
2 It is not okay to hit or shove people just because you feel like it, so Fred is right and John is 
wrong.
3 There is no fact of  the matter about unqualified claims like “It’s okay to hit or shove people just 
because you feel like it.” Different cultures believe different things, and it is not absolutely true 
or false that it’s okay to hit people just because you feel like it.
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In this particular study, approximately 57% of  participants chose either the first or second option, 
seemingly rejecting the idea that one and the same action (such as hitting others because one 
feels like it) can be both morally permissible and, at the same time, morally impermissible relative 
to different moral frameworks. Instead, those choosing either the first or second option are sug-
gesting that there is a fact of  the matter as to whether hitting or shoving is morally good or bad, 
such that anyone who disagrees or holds different opinions must be mistaken. A substantial 
minority (43%), though, opted for the third option, responding to the disagreement by claiming 
that cultural differences render morality relative in nature.
Nichols’s experiments represent an early attempt at exploring FMO experimentally. Arguably, 
though, a later study by geoffrey goodwin and John Darley (2008) was instrumental in spear-
heading the recent wave of  experimental activity. We should discuss this study in some detail, as 
it inspired many of  the studies that followed. In this study, they presented participants with a 
large number of  statements chosen randomly from four different domains:
•	 factual domain (e.g., “the earth is not at the center of  the known universe”)
•	 moral domain (e.g., “consciously discriminating against someone on the basis of  race is  morally 
wrong”)
•	 conventional domain (“talking loudly and constantly to the person next to you during a lecture 
is a permissible action”)
•	 aesthetic domain (e.g., “classical music is better than rock music”)
Participants were first asked to what extent they agreed with these statements. Next, they were 
told that none of  the statements had, in fact, elicited full agreement; whatever judgment they hap-
pened to hold, there was some fellow participant holding the opposite view. Once again,  participants 
were asked how they would interpret such disagreements. This time, the options were:
1 The other person is surely mistaken.
2 It is possible that neither you nor the other person is mistaken.
3 It could be that you are mistaken, and the other person is correct.
4 Other.
Looking just at the moral statements, 70% of  participants believed that in the case of  disagree-
ment, the other individual had to be incorrect in her moral judgments (e.g., option 1). As goodwin 
and Darley note, this seems to suggest that people are objectivist about moral matters. Indeed, 
looking across all the four domains, participants’ tendency to give objectivist answers were only 
stronger within the factual domain (an unsurprising result), and were weaker in both the con-
ventional and aesthetic domains.
Some might claim that these two results, in themselves, might count against FMO. If  FMO were 
true, then we wouldn’t find such a sizable minority of  participants answering as non‐objectivists. 
However, on a charitable reading of  FMO, the claim is not that every single person is an objec-
tivist about morality. Surely there will be outliers. And if  this is the case then we are left arguing 
about what is a large enough of  a minority in order to bring pressure on the claim. The results of  
these studies cannot show that the claim is dubious, even if  the minorities are sizable. This is 
especially true since the populations in these studies were undergraduate students who, as we 
shall see later, might be in a peculiar stage in their moral development that skews toward 
 relativism (more on this later).
More importantly, perhaps, goodwin and Darley focus on the average levels of  objectivism in 
the moral domain, and on average, it seems as though the folk show a tendency toward objec-
tivism for moral claims. However, the average is misleading, for there was remarkable variation 
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in levels of  objectivism when we look across the moral items. For example, in one study, they had 
subjects rate various moral statements such as “Consciously discriminating against someone on 
the basis of  race is morally wrong” as being either (a) true statement, (b) false statement, or (c) 
opinion or attitude. See Figure 14.1.
Some of  the items were indeed seen as being highly objective, with a majority of  participants 
believing the statement to be “true” (e.g., opening gunfire in a crowd, conscious racial 
discrimination, cheating on an exam, and robbery), garnering a majority of  true or false 
responses (overwhelmingly true, as expected).3 Yet, some of  the most highly charged moral issues 
(e.g., abortion, stem cell research, and assisted suicide) garnered the lowest ratings of  objec-
tivism, with the overwhelming majority of  participants labeling these as attitudes or opinions (as 
opposed to true or false statements). In other words, when presented with a selection of  moral 
transgressions, they gave objective groundings to only some of  them, while giving clearly relative 
groundings to other issues. As goodwin and Darley note, “meta‐ethical judgments about the 
truth of  ethical claims appear to be highly sensitive to the content of  the claims in question (i.e., 
robbery vs. abortion)” (1346).
Why is this so? A couple of  things might be said to explain the disparity here. First, some have 
suggested that objectivity judgments here parallel participants’ sense of  moral consensus on the 
item being judged. Indeed, subsequent studies have shown just such a correlation. For example, 
goodwin and Darley (2010) found that perceived consensus concerning a moral issue correlated 
with levels of  objectivism for that moral issue. In one study, they had participants answer to what 
extent they agreed that certain moral actions were either good (e.g., saving a drowning person) 
or bad (e.g., assaulting someone for disparaging our favorite sports team); to what extent they 
thought there could be true judgments in the relevant case; and what percentage of  fellow 
Americans they thought would find the actions good or bad. Finally, they were told that at least 
some other participants disagreed with their judgments concerning these actions, and whether 
they thought these other participants were therefore wrong. They found that participants’ own 
estimates of  perceived consensus among fellow Americans predicted their objectivity ratings. In a 
separate study, they found that presenting participants with bogus data about consensus on moral 
items from classmates had an effect on their judgments concerning objectivity for those items, 
such that higher levels of  (bogus) consensus increased their beliefs concerning the objectivity of  
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Figure 14.1 Overall percentages of  “true” or “false” judgments for moral items.
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those items. In related research, James Beebe (2014) found a similar effect. Thus,  perceived 
 consensus seems to at least partly explain why folk find some moral claims to be objective. Yet, 
since consensus can move or change this does not seem to reflect the sort of  objectivism philoso-
phers have in mind concerning FMO.
A second way to explain the variation among the moral items would point to a potential 
problem in the way the moral items were chosen. goodwin and Darley (as the experimenters) 
came up with all the items and sorted them into the four domains. And their choices seem 
 reasonable. However, we shouldn’t be surprised if  some participants didn’t agree with their cate-
gorization. If  this is the case, then (an objectivist might say) we can expect that some participants 
did not show their true objectivist colors because they were not presented with what they believed 
to be paradigmatic moral items. The difference can be summed up as one between taking a third‐
person approach (where the experimenter deems what counts as a moral item) and a first‐person 
approach (where the participant deems what counts as a moral item).4 Jennifer Wright, Piper 
grandjean, and Cullen McWhite (2013) allowed participants to first classify the various moral 
statements into the four domains (factual, moral, conventional, and taste) themselves, and only 
then asked them to respond to a disagreement scenario in order to assess their commitment to 
objectivism. Did participants display greater objectivism for those items they themselves deemed 
to be moral? Using the same items by goodwin and Darley, they found no difference between 
mean levels of  objectivism for the moral and conventional items. There was also no difference in 
levels objectivism for particular items whether they were classified as moral, conventional, or 
taste. Wright et al. found this pattern when adding qualitative analysis as well, and conclude that 
folk are neither objectivists nor relativists about morality, but rather pluralists.
Thus far, the studies surveyed tend to provide some support to FMO, but the evidence remains 
equivocal. Some have argued that ordinary moral discourse most often occurs in a particular 
context—namely between individuals of  a shared moral community. The community itself  need 
not be particularly homogeneous nor salient to the individuals engaging in moral discourse. 
Nevertheless, this shared context may help to explain why it is that folk seem to embrace objec-
tivism, though in an inconsistent manner. Put succinctly—moral judgments may seem objective 
to participants in ordinary moral discourse because they normally think in terms of  a single 
moral framework. However, when thinking across moral frameworks and considering alternative 
perspectives, their commitments to objectivism may wane.
Philosophers have noted this feature of  ordinary moral discourse—namely that much gets 
left unsaid owing to shared context. For example, Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian, and David 
Wong (2007) argue that “in practice, moral imperatives and judgments are often exchanged in 
particular contexts which include tacit background assumptions and qualifications. Indeed, they 
can be stated categorically only if  we assume such a contextual framework” (47). Shared context 
is thus thought to explain the categorical nature of  ordinary moral discourse. It is often both 
unnecessary and potentially strange to state that we are sharing a particular moral framework 
when we are discussing moral issues. We state moral judgments categorically and absolutely not 
because we think they refer to objective, mind‐independent moral facts, but because our shared 
context allows us to do so. “Of  course,” Flanagan et al. write, “we could include all the possible 
exceptions and qualifications within the imperatives themselves, but that would assume a small 
or manageable finite set of  such qualifications and exceptions, as well as a way to efficiently 
deploy them. Both of  these claims are contentious; the former would be impossibly cumbersome, 
the latter cognitively onerous” (47). Peter Railton has provided a useful everyday example to 
illustrate this general point.
For example, suppose that you have just come back from an afternoon hike and I greet you:
(A) Welcome back! Help yourself  to whatever’s in the fridge.
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Despite the unqualified permission (A) appears to extend, it is clear to both of  us in this context that 
I have not authorized you to clean out my refrigerator, to load your car and save you from doing your 
weekly shopping, or to warm up tonight’s lentil soup to soak your feet. The invitation conveyed by (A) 
has contextually understood conditions and qualifications that go without saying. We can, of  course, 
make many of  these conditions and qualifications explicit, and rewrite (A) as a conditional, hedged 
permission: If  you are hungry and would like to eat, then you should feel free to serve yourself  a rea-
sonable amount of  food from the fridge. (Railton 2007, 39)
Similarly, Stephen Finlay writes that “It would be strange, for example, for the captain of  a rugby 
team (the All Blacks, say) in a mid‐game huddle to prefix his statements about which play ought 
to be run with expressions like ‘If  you want us to score a try,’ or ‘In order to win this game.’ The 
obvious need not be stated” (Finlay 2008, 353). These philosophers draw a parallel with the 
normal context of  moral discourse. “In the moral case this is even more true: moral ends or stan-
dards are typically shared by members of  a society, assumed to be shared, and easily identifiable” 
(ibid). Thus, when we say something along the lines of  “X is forbidden” or “X is morally wrong,” 
we issue statements that seem, on the face of  it, to be categorical, absolute, and without condition. 
However, tacitly, there are in fact such conditions and qualifiers that are left unsaid. One such 
qualifier may be that we share a moral framework, or that our moral frameworks overlap suffi-
ciently so as to make such categorical judgments possible.
Let us return to the empirical data. A common feature of  the studies discussed earlier is that 
they use a disagreement task to probe people’s metaethical commitments. This task presents sub-
jects with two individuals who have differing moral judgments about a particular case, and then 
asks whether these two individuals can both be correct, or whether instead at least one of  them 
has to be wrong. The individuals are depicted (whether implicitly or explicitly) as members of  the 
same moral community—indeed, as members of  the same moral community as the subjects in 
the experiment. And, as noted, a majority of  subjects seem to think that in a case of  disagreement 
such as the one portrayed, at least one of  the disagreeing individuals must be wrong—that two 
individuals of  the same moral community can’t have differing judgments about a moral case 
without one of  them being mistaken.
What if, instead of  working within a single moral framework, participants were instead 
 presented with disagreement tasks where the two appraisers of  the moral case stem from differ-
ent cultural backgrounds? This hypothesis was pursued by Hagop Sarkissian and colleagues 
(2012). Like the studies earlier, they deployed a disagreement task to gauge folk metaethical 
 commitments. However, they varied the identities of  the disagreeing appraisers. In “same 
culture” condition, the two appraisers were described as having the same cultural background 
(fellow classmates at a university). In the “other culture,” one of  the appraisers was instead 
described as a member of  an isolated community of  individuals preserving their traditional way 
of  life in the Amazonian rainforest. Finally, in the “extraterrestrial condition,” one of  the 
appraisers was described as a member of  an extraterrestrial species who have radically different 
psychologies than those of  humans. They found that participants in the first (same culture) 
condition were characteristically objectivist about cases concerning canonical moral transgres-
sions (such as murder and assault). They denied that two appraisers from the same culture could 
both be right in a case of  moral disagreement. However, participants were increasingly relativist 
in the second (other culture) and third (extraterrestrial) conditions. That is, as the identities of  
the appraisers became increasingly divergent, folk seemed to recognize that both of  the disagree-
ing individuals could be correct relative to their own frameworks, and that there was no abso-
lutely correct fact of  the matter regarding the case. If  folk were indeed objectivists then it would 
not matter that the disagreeing individuals held different values or ends. An act is wrong for an 
objectivist irrespective of  what people think about it. The fact that Sarkissian et al. found a 
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significant drop in objectivism across these conditions suggests that people may tacitly believe 
that moral statements have unspoken qualifiers and conditions—namely something’s being a 
moral fact is only relative to a particular moral framework.
This idea of  taking perspectives has cropped up in a number of  studies in this area, and a 
pattern seems to emerge (though much work needs to be done). For example, Edward Cokely 
and Adam Feltz (2008) hypothesized that personality traits might play a moderating role in 
folk intuitions about the status of  morality. In particular, some individuals score high in the 
trait of  being open to experience, which includes being receptive to the unfamiliar and less 
likely to abide by accepted conventions and authorities. Cokely and Feltz hypothesized that 
when such individuals are confronted by individuals who disagree with them, or who reject 
socially accepted norms, they will be less likely to deem them wrong or mistaken. They might 
be open to the possibility, instead, that their own socially accepted norms might need to yield 
or admit of  flexibility. Using the same materials developed by Nichols (2004), they first 
tested for a tendency to embrace objectivism by using a disagreement task. They then 
provided subjects with a standard Big Five personality inventory (gosling, Rentfrow and 
Swann Jr 2003). They found that a majority of  individuals in their sample (FSU students) 
rejected objectivism in the disagreement task. They also found that those who scored high in 
openness to experience were significantly more likely to respond to the disagreement task by 
rejecting objectivism. (Those scoring low in openness to experience were just as likely to give 
objectivist and non‐objectivist answers.) Openness to experience seems correlated with 
metaethical relativism.
Relatedly, goodwin and Darley (2010), in follow‐up studies, found a correlation between 
 displaying a facility with disjunctive reasoning and being a metaethical relativist. Consider the 
following problem: There are five blocks in a stack, where the second one from the top is green 
and the fourth is not green. Is a green block definitely on top of  a non‐green block? Many people 
feel, intuitively, as though there is insufficient information to decide. But there are just two possi-
bilities for that third block: if  the third block is green it would sit over a non‐green block (the 
fourth block), and if  it is not green it would be right under a green block (the second block) so the 
answer is “yes.” Arriving at the correct answer requires unpacking the various alternatives for 
the third block, then working through the problem. And those who answered the question cor-
rectly showed significantly lower tendencies toward objectivism than those who did not. In other 
words, being able to unpack alternative possibilities predicts that one does not embrace objec-
tivism about morality.
A finding not directly speaking to the issue of  perspective‐taking also fits this pattern. James 
Beebe and David Sackris (2010) investigated whether or not folk metaethical views are stable 
across one’s lifetime. Using similar disagreement tasks as found in other studies reported here, 
they found that participants’ tendencies toward objectivism varied across age groups. A pattern 
emerged whereby participants aged 12–16 years of  age and participants 30 years of  age or older 
were both significantly more objectivist than participants aged 17–29 years old. (This corrobo-
rates widespread anecdotal evidence that undergraduate students in philosophy courses tend to 
avow moral relativism.) Why this pattern? Why is it that relativism is most prominent in this age 
group? As Beebe and Sackris note, the period immediately after high school is one of  flux, when 
most individuals move away from home and live independently. This often coincides with 
enrolling in college, broadening one’s experience, and skeptically probing one’s most deeply held 
beliefs. During this period, individuals are most likely to be open to new perspectives and to envi-
sion a plurality of  options for how their lives might progress. Thus, relativism correlates with a 
time of  openness to experience, or considering alternative possibilities, and of  seriously enter-
taining different points of  view. It is also possible that this is the result of  generational differences 
in their subject pool. Future research will help clarify the issue.
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Finally, more recent evidence suggests that perspectives and frameworks are important when 
it comes not only to the appraisers of  a moral action but also to the perpetrators of  the actions 
themselves. Suppose someone is depicted as committing a moral transgression—say, stealing 
from their employer to pay for an expensive holiday. Does it matter whether the person stealing 
from her employer appraises her own action as morally wrong or morally permissible? If  folk 
were truly objectivists, then such appraisals shouldn’t matter, for the wrongness is the property 
of  the action and does not hinge upon how people think about it. Yet, in some recent work, 
katinka Quintelier, Delphine De Smet, and Daniel Fessler (2014) have probed the extent to which 
the actor’s appraisal of  her own actions is also relevant. If  the actor deems her action as morally 
wrong, then this tends to increase objectivist responses, whereas if  she deems her action as mor-
ally permissible, subjects tend to soften their objectivist responses.
Overall, then, folk judgments about the status of  morality seem sensitive to numerous factors, 
including features of  the cases (e.g., how they are framed, the types of  moral violations involved) 
as well as features of  the participants themselves (e.g., their age, and personality).
14.5 Conclusion
Folk moral commitments are complex and include the influence of  numerous variables. At times, 
they seem to respond as objectivists, at times as relativists. Much of  the research thus far has 
been framed as concerning “whether the folk are X,” where X stands for objectivist or relativist. 
However, given the variability noted earlier, perhaps this question is no longer a useful one to 
pursue. As work on folk metaethics continues, it seems that rather than asking something as 
general as whether people are objectivists or relativists, we should be asking different questions. 
For example, we might ask: under what conditions do folk show a tendency toward objectivism? 
Which type of  folk show this tendency, and for which issues?
And just as the empirical research is revealing a messier situation than one would have antic-
ipated having read the philosophical literature, the implications of  these findings for philosophical 
metaethics are similarly complex. It is hard to see how any claim that folk just are moral objectiv-
ists full stop can escape this empirical scrutiny unblemished. While philosophers have good 
reason to think that objectivism is a part of  folk morality, it is certainly not all of  it. How and to 
what extent this shifts issues in contemporary debates remains an open question. Yet, two possi-
bilities stand out as likely. First, it seems that philosophers maintaining the truth of  moral objec-
tivism as the best theoretical account of  the status of  morality cannot bolster their arguments by 
claiming that their view best coheres with the folk view, for the folk view itself  is not plainly or 
baldly objectivist. Second, philosophical error theorists face a significant retrenchment of  the 
scope of  their theory. If  folk aren’t committed to objectivism in any strong sense then it’s not at 
all clear that they are in error about anything. At best, error theory would be recast so as to apply 
to that sub‐segment of  the population that may, in fact, be committed to objectivism.
Notes
1 The literature in this area tends to use the terms “objectivism” and “relativism” in ways that can be mis-
leading. Specifically, it may be misleading to characterize objectivism as the denial of  relativism, since relativ-
ists maintain that there are objective moral facts relative to the moral frameworks of  particular communities. 
“Absolutism” arguably better captures the contrast between relativism and objectivism, as it conveys the idea 
that there can only be one absolute set of  moral facts (as opposed to several, each relative to some community). 
Having noted this issue, I will be using “objectivism” and “absolutism” interchangeably in what follows.
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2 Presumably, we react very differently if  the persons involved seem otherwise unreasonable, ignorant, or 
incompetent. In such cases, the mere fact of  disagreement would likely have little sway over our own 
moral convictions; disagreement might even further entrench our convictions.
3 Note that, even for those who chose to say the statements were “true” or “false,” these answers are 
 consistent with a relativist reading, as the questions do not disambiguate something’s being “true abso-
lutely” as opposed to “true relative to some perspective.” See Beebe and Sackris (2010) for further critical 
discussion.
4 There are strengths and weaknesses to both approaches, though the third‐person is dominant. See 
Meindl and graham (2014) for helpful discussion.
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